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Abstract
Probabilistic insurance is an insurance policy involving a small probability that the consumer will not
be reimbursed. Survey data suggest that people dislike probabilistic insurance and demand more than
a 20~1o reduction in the premium to compensate for a 1 qo default risk. While these preferences are
intuitively appealing they are difficult to reconcile with expected utility theory. Under highly
plausible assumptions about the utility function, willingness to pay for probabilistic insurance should
be very close to willingness to pay for full insurance less the default risk. However, the reluctance to
buy probabilistic insurance is predicted by the weighting function of prospect theory. This finding
highlights the potential role of the weighting funtion to explain insurance.
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JEL Classification: D813
[nsurance is a contract in which an individual pays a fixed premium and is promised to be paid in the
event that a specific hazard occurs. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) introduced the notion of
"probabilistic insurance" (PI), namely an insurance policy which, in the event that the hazard occurs,
pays off with some probability strictly less than one. They showed, for a particulaz type of
probabilistic insurance, that while consumers find such policies unattractive, an expected utility
maximizer would actually prefer the probabilistic policy (at an appropriately reduced premium) to a
policy that pays off with certainty. They also showed that the aversion to PI is consistent with
prospect theory. Later, Segal (1988) showed that the rejection of PI (of the original Kahneman 8c
Tversky type) is also consistent with rank-dependent utility theory.
Probabilistic insurance seems like a novel concept, but most insurance policies are, in fact,
probabilistic. Insurance policies typically specify some even[s (e.g., wars, "acts of god,"
contributory negligence) in which the consumer is not reimbursed for losses, whether or not the
consumer was aware of these contingencies ex ante. Furthermore, there is always a possibility
-however remote- that the insurer will not pay for some other reason such as insolvency or fraud.
Although such default risks are not explicitly acknowledged, they are present in any real insurance
setting.
In light ofthe insight that all insurance is essentially probabilistic, we provide here a more
thorough account of the topic, from both descriptive and normative perspectives. To do so, we
analyze a different type of PI than the one originally addressed by Kahneman and Tversky. The
original version of Pl was selected for study because it was analytically tractable and led to the
surprising result that a risk averse expected utility maximizer favors probabilistic over standard
insurance. However, it has the special feature that in the event that the claim was not paid, the
premiuui would be rcfunded. This contingency does not adequately capture the risk of defaul[ or
fraud because in these instances a premium refund might be problematic. In this article we
investigate a more natural form of PI that dces not involve refunding of premia. We also discuss the
issue of consumer surplus that was not addressed in the original treatment.
Section 1 presents survey data which reveal that people also dislike the revised version of PI.
Section 2 shows that, under expected utility with very plausible assumptions about the utility
function, the reservation price for probabilistic insurance is very close to the actuarially adjusted
reservation price fbr standard insurance. Section 3 shows that the observed discrepancy between the
reservation price for probabilistic insurance and the actuarial adjustment of the reservation price of
standard insurance can be explained by the weighting function of prospect theory. The implications
of these results to the analysis of risk bearing are discussed in Section 4. Proofs are presented in the
appendix.1. Survey Data
Probabilistic insurance is intuitively unappealing. This intuition is shazed by Robert Merton (1993)
who observes that s[ellar credit ratings for investment banking firms issuing derivative securities are
very important because investors are loathe to bear the risk of the bank's insolvency. As he put it
"Even if the insurance company offers an actuarially fair reduction in the price of the insurance, to
reflect the risk ofinsolvency, a risk averse customer would prefer the policy with the least default
risk. Indeed, on introspection, I doubt that many real world customers would consciously agree to
accept non-trivial risk on a á200,0001ife insurance policy in retum for a large reduction in the annual
premium, say from ~400 to ~300" (p. 43).
To confirm that Merton and we are not alone in thinking that PI is unattractive, we have conducted
some surveys of various groups (students, executives, portfolio managers, etc.). Necessarily, these
surveys are hypothetical. Though one could devise similar experiments for real money, the stakes
would, ofcourse, have to be affordably low. We believe that in this domain, thought experiments
for large sums can be more instructive than real experiments for pennies. As the results show, the
subjects share our (and Merton's) intuitions quite strongly.
The first question was given to a group of Stanford students (N-86). It illustrates the problems
we investigate below.
(A). Imagine that you have graduated from college, you hold ajob, and you own a small house.
Assume that there is a risk of 1 in 200 per year (i.e., ll2 of 10l0) that your house will catch fire. The
full replacement cost of the house is ~125,000.
1. What is the most you would be willing to pay (per year) for an insurance policy that will cover all
damages due to fire? ~
Median response: ~700.
2. Imagine that you have been offered a different kind ofpolicy called probabilistic fire insurance.
This policy is identical to [he previous one except that there is 10lo chance that in the event of a fire,
your claim will not be paid. You can think about the risk this way: ín case of fue, the insurance
company will draw a 2-digit number at random, and if it matches the last 2 digits of your social
security number, your costs will not be covered. What is the mos[ you would be willing to pay (per
year) for probabilistic fire insurance'? S
Median response: ~500.( B). Now suppose that the replacement cost of your house is á250,000 ( instead of ~ 125,000), but
your total wealth remains unchanged. That is, the house now represents a larger portion of your total
wealth. Assume the risk remains the same ( I in 200 per year).
3. What is [he most you would be willing to pay (per year) for an insurance policy that will cover all
damages due to fire in this case? ~
Median response: ~ 1300.
4. What is the most you would be willing to pay for probabilistic fire insurance in this case'?
~
Median response: ~900.
These data indicate that probabilistic insurance is relatively unattractive: People demand about a 30qo
reduction in the premium to compensate them for a lo~c chance that their claim will not be paid. This
finding agrees with Merton's introspection, as well as with the results of similar surveys summarized
below. Indeeà, ii is not sunt rising thai risk averse decision makers wnuld require substantially more
than a lolo reduction in the premium [o compensate for a loJo risk of not being paid. What is
surprising, however, is that no substantial reduction beyond 10lo can be accommodated by expected
utility theory with any plausible u[ility funetion. To illustrate, assume a logarithmic utility function
]n(xtk). According to this function, if the reservation price (i.e., the most the decision maker is
willing to pay) in question (A l) is ~700 (implying k- 602,980) then the reservation price for
probabilistic insurance should be ~692.9952, i.e., about half a cent less than the actuarial ~7.00 ( l qo)
reduction in the premium; a far cry from the median response of ~500 (a 2801o reduction). As will be
shown later, similar results hold for other utility functions.
It is noteworthy that, while the majority of the respondents were willing to pay above the
actuarially fair premium for standard insurance (Questions I and 3), the majority of respondents were
not willing to pay the actuarially fair premium for probabilistic insurance (Questions 2 and 4). Note
also that doubling the replacement cost for the house has little effect on the ratio of the reservation
prices for a s[andard and probabilistic insurance. As will be shown later, these observations are
consistent with prospect theory.
We have studied attitudes regarding probabilistic insurance in other contexts using two other
groups of respondents. These surveys differed from survey 1, described above, in that we did no[
elicit a reservation price for standard insurance. Instead, we specified this price and asked the
respondents how much less they would pay for the probabilistic version with a lolo default risk. The
results of these surveys are given in Table t which also summarizes the data from survey l.6
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
In surveys 2 and 3 the respondents were also asked to state their reservation price for standard
insurance assuming that the amounts at risk were increased by 15~70 or lOqo, respectively. [n both
cases, the median prices increased proportionally, as implied by constant relative risk aversion.
Although survey data of this type have obvious limitations, they clearly suggest that people find the
concept of probabilistic insurance unattractive.
2. Expected Utility
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
We analyze here the simplest examples of standard and probabilistic insurance. We assume that
with no insurance (NI) one loses Z if the hazard H occurs, and nothing if it does not (see Figure
la).l Standard insurance (SI) is illustrated in Figure lb. Here one pays a premium y, and is fully
reimbursed if the hazard occurs. Probabilistic instuance (PI) is illustrated in Figure lc. Here one
pays a reduced premium, x, but if the hazazd H occurs, there is a possibility R that the claim will not
be reimbursed.2 We assume that the premiums y and x aze the reservation prices for SI and PI,
respec[ively, so that the decision maker is indifferent between SI and NI for premium y, and between
PI and NI for premium x. We study the relation between x and y. Naturally, the greater the
reluctance to purchase Pl, the lower the reservation price. Implications for the case where the
premiums do not coincide with the reservation prices are discussed later.
This section assumes expected utility theory. However, the analysis is readily extended to
nonexpected utility models based on decision weights. For this reason, we denote the utility function
by v, and set v(0)-0. Throughout the paper we assume that v has a positive continuous derivative
1The loss in Question A in Section I can be interpreted, more generally, as a probability distribution over the interval
[O,Z]. Remark A3 in the Appendix shows that variability of Z dces not affect the subsequent expected utility analysis.
zThe present definition of probabilistic insurance differs slightly from that used by Kahneman 8c Tversky ( 1979) in
which whenever H occurs the consumer loses either Z or y depending on whether R dces or dces not occuc The present
definition provides a more realistic description of default risk.v'. Let p be the probability ofthe event H; p can be either an objective or a subjective probability.
According to expected utility theory, if the decision maker is indifferent between SI and NI, then
pv(-Z) - v(-y).
The expected utility ofPI is
prv(-Z-x) t (1-pr)v(-x),
where r is the conditional probability of R given H, i.e. the probability that the insurance company
will not pay given that the hazard has occurred.
Recall that in PI, the insurance company reimburses the consumer only in a(1-r)-fraction of the
cases. Hence (1-r)y is called the acruarially adjustedpremium for PI. This would be the premium
for PI assuming lineaz utility, and it provides a useful standard of comparison for x. The results of
our survey, however, indicate that x was considerably lower than (1-r)y, presumably because people
did not liké the additional risk entailed by PI. The following theorem provides limits for x under
expected utility theory with a concave, i.e. risk averse, utility function. The expressions are
somewhat complex, but are discussed after. A simpler first-order approximation is provided
subsequently, in Theorem 2.2.
Theorem 2.1 (Upper and lower bounds for x). If v is concave then
(1-r)Y t ry(1 - v(0) )? x?(1-r)Y - rYP(v ~,~)Y) - t). O
v'(-Y )
Note that, by concavity of v, v'(0)w'(-y) is less than 1, hence the upper bound is greater than
(1-r)y. Similarly, v'(-Z-y)Iv'(0) is greater than 1, hence the lower bound is less than (1-r)y.
However, as we next show informally, in a first-order approximation the upper and lower bound are
essentially equal to (l-r)y, which is the actuarially adjusted premium. A formal derivation is
presented in the Appendix.
Consider the plausible assumption that v is approximately linear on the interval [-y,0] and v'(0) is
approximately equal to v'(-y). Hence the upper bound for x is approximately ( 1-r)y. Turning to the
lower bound, note that v'(-Z-y) is larger than v'(0) by concavity. Our approximation is based on
the assumption that v'(-Z-y)w'(0) may be large, say l0, but is not extreme and is considerably
smaller than Ilp, which typically exceeds 100. These condi[ions are likely to be met if the loss of Z
is not ruinous. All our survey questions appear to meet this condition. Under the above
assumptions, the second [erm of the lower bound,s
v~(-z-y)
-ryP( v'(0) - 1),
is much smaller than ry. In other words, the lower bound for x, like the upper bound, is also
approximately (1-r)y. As we prove in the appendix, this approximation dces not depend on the
concavity of v.
Theorem 2.2. The reservation price x for PI is approximately3 equal to the actuarially adjusted
premium(1-r)y. ~
This result is quite surprising. It shows that in a first-order approximation, the reservation price
for PI according to expected utility theory is very close to the actuarially adjusted premium. In other
words, the curvature of utility has essentially no impact. Whether the reservation price x is actually
higher or lower than the actuarially adjusted premium for concave utility, depends on second-order
effects. An examination of the proofof Theorem 2.1 reveals another surprising fact: For some
concave utility functions, x is in fact higher than the actuarially adjusted premium (1-r)y. This is
proved in the Appendix (Proposition A.2; see also the elucidation above that proposition), and
illustrated in Table 2(Examples 9, 10, and I 1). Hence, a decision maker with a concave utility may
prefer actuarially adjusted PI to SI although PI appears "riskier" than SI.
lnsert Table 2 here
----------------------------------------------
Table 2 presents numerical results for PI for twenty concave utility functions, described in the first
column.~ All the functions belong to the HARA-family. This family was defined by Merton (1971)
and contains the commonly used parametric forms. The utility functions in Table 2 form five groups
with four functions in each group. The first group (1-4) includes logarithmic functions. The second
group (5-8) includes positive powers of positive numbers. The third group (9-12) includes power
functions on the nega[ive reals. Here, the exponent exceeds one to ensure concavity, and the values
raised to the given power are positive (zero is excluded by the requirement that v' ~ 0). The fourth
group (13-16) includes hyperbolic functions, and the last group (17-20) includes exponential
functions. For each family an example is considered with an extreme degree ofglobal risk aversion
3Formally, x~y tends to 1-r (i.e., x-( I-r)y is "o(y)") if r and Z are kept fixed, y tends ro 0, and the equali[y pv(-Z) -
v(-y) is kept so tha[ p also [ends to 0. The appendix gives details.
4To simplify the display, we did not normalize the utility functions to satisfy v(0) - 0; this, of course, does not affect
the results.9
(v'(-Z)Iv'(0)-100 or 1000), an example with substantial global risk aversion (d(-Zyv'(0)-25),
and two examples with small global risk aversion (v'(-Z)Id(0)-2).
The last column in Table 2 gives the reservation price x for PI, divided by y. The lowest value of
the quotient xry in the table is 0.986, which is close to the actuarially adjusted premium of 0.99, and
very far from the values observed in our surveys. As noted above, in some cases (9, 10, and l 1) the
ratio exceeds 0.99, showing that a concave utility function can give rise to a preference for
probabilistic insurance. These results illustrate the preceding analysis and show that the pronounced
aversion to probabilistic insurance cannot be explained by any realistic curvature of u[ility.
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that, under expected utility, the reservation price for PI
approximately coincides with the actuarial adjustment of the reservation price for SL This holds
regardless of whether the actual premium coincides with the reservation price. In reality, of course,
the premium set by the insurance company may fall either above or below a consumer's reservation
price. We next consider [hese possibilities. Given a noncompulsary standard insurance, we
distinguish among three classes of consumers: the insured, whose reservation price exceeds the
actual premium; the uninsured, whose reserva[ion price is below the premium; and the indifferent,
whcsc reservation price eoincides with the premium. We assume that expected utility holds and that
PI, with an actuarially adjusted premium, is made available.
First we suppose that SI is no longer available, i.e., that PI has replaced SI. In this case, people
who bought SI will now buy PI, and people who did not buy SI will not buy PI. To verify, recall
that the reservatiun price for PI is approximately (1-r) times the reservation price for SI, and the
premium for PI is (1-r) times the premium for SI. Therefore, the reservution price for PI excecds [he
PI premium if and only if the reservation price for SI exceeds the SI premium. In other words,
rcplacing SI by an actuarially adjusted PI will not change the status of the insured and the uninsured.
Expected utility, therefore, makes the coun[erintuitive prediction that the insurance industry would
not lose many clients if SI were replaced by an actuarially adjusted PL Only clients whose reservation
price for SI is very close [o the actual premium (within I qc for 1~lo default risk) might be lost.
Second, let us also consider [he case where SI remains available, so that the option of PI is added
to the option of SI, and let us see what expected utility predicts here. In this case, consumers are
unlikely to purchase PI. For the consumers who have a strong preference for SI over NI, PI is not
very attractive because it involves an additional risk. For the consumers who have a strong preference
for NI over SI, ac[uarially adjusted PI is not an attractive op[ion because the premium remains too
close to the SI premium, which was deemed too high. For consumers who are roughly indifferent
between SI and NI, Theorem 2.2 applies, and they will be approximately indifferent between these
options and PI.
We conclude fhis section with a numerical example ofthe case where the actual premium is lower
than the reservation price, so tha[ S[ yields consumer surplus. Suppose that S[ is offered at an
actuarially fair premium of 5400, and [hat Z- S f 00,000, thus p- 0.004, and r- 0.01. Assume a10
risk averse utility function v(z) -1n(300,000-z), so that the consumer indeed prefers SI over NI.
According to expected utility, the premium that makes probabilistic insurance as attractive as SI in
this case is á395.12. lt is noteworthy that this value is less than, but very close to, the actuarially
adjusted premium of á396, even though the SI premium here is well below the reservation price.
3. Prospect Theory
3.1. Basic Results
We next show that reluctance to purchase probabilistic insurance can be explained by the weighting
function of prospect theory.5 Because all outcomes are nonpositive, prospect theory coincides with
the rank-dependent theories for risk (Quiggin, 1981) and uncertainty (Schmeidler, 1989). Again, we
assume in this section that y and x are the reservation prices for SI and PI, respectively. According
to prospect theory, the overall value of SI is v(-y) and the value of NI is pv(-Z), where v is the value
function, p-W-(H), and W- is the weighting function for losses. Since we consider only
nonpositive outcomes, the superscript is suppressed. Again it is assumed that v' is positive and
continuous.
The value of PI (see Figure lc) now ís
prv(-Z-x) t (1-pr)v(-x), (3.1)
where r is defined below. There are two different ways of applying prospect theory to the two-stage
tree in Figure lc: the reduced form and the stepwise form. In the reduced form (sometimes called the
normal form), the value ofPI is
W(HR)v(-Z-x) t (1-W(HR))v(-x)
where W(HR) is the decision weight associated with the conjunction of the events H in the first stage
and R in the second. The decision weight of v(-Z-x) can be expressed as pr by defining
W(HR) W(HR)
r - p - W(H) '
SBecause each of the prospects considered in this paper involves only two ou[comes, both nonpositive, the separable
version of Kahneman 8c Tversky (1979) and the cumulative version of Tversky 8t Kahneman (1992) yield iden[ical
results.u
which in general is differen[ from W(R).
The stepwise form (sometimes called backward induction) proceeds as follows. First, one
evaluate~ th~ H-branch of the tree as
W(R)v(-Z-x) t (1-W(Rpv(-x).
Second, the value of PI is obtained as
P~W(R)v(-Z-x) t (1-W(Rl)v(-x)) f (l-p)v(-x).
which can be rewritten as
pW(R)v(-Z-x) t (1-pW(R))v(-x).
By setting r-W(R), the above equation reduces to Equation (3.1).
Because S1. NI, and PI are all indifferent by assumption, we obtain
pv(-Z) - v(-y) - prv(-Z-x) t (1-pr)v(-x).
Note that the same relations hold for expected utility except that nnw the weights p and r have a
different interpretaUOn. Therefore Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 hold with the new interpretation.
Theorem 3.1. If v is concave, then
v'(0) v'(-Z-y)
(1-r)Y t ry(1 - )? x?( l-r)Y - tyP( v.(~~ - 1). O
v'(-y)
Theorem 3.2. The reservation price x is approximately ( l-r)y. O
Under the present interpretation, r is defined in terms of(subjective) decision weights.
Consequently, (1-r)y is no longer the actuarially adjusted premium. Suppose that we are given an
objective probability of R conditional un H, denoted by r~`. Obviously, r~ may differ from the
decision weight r. We can rewrite ( I-r)y, the first-order approximation for x, as
x - ( L-r~`)Y - (r-r~)y.12
That is, x can be expressed as the actuarially adjusted premium (1-r~`)y minus a component that
reflects the discrepancy between the decision weight r and the objective probability r~`. Letting X
denote the premium to be paid for PI, preference for PI over NI means
X 5 x - (1-r~`)y - (r-r~)y,
or
(1-r~`)Y - X ? (r-r')Y-
The left-hand side is the "actuarial gain" for the decision maker and the right-hand side reflects the
deviation of decision weight from objec[ive probability. Thus P[ is acceptable if and only if the left-
hand side (the actuarial gain) exceeds the right-hand side (the deviation from expected u[ility). In
accord with experimental data, prospect theory assumes that decision weights are subadditive (i.e.,
the most extreme outcomes are overweighted and intermediate outcomes are underweighted; see
Tversky 8t Kahneman, 1992; Camerer 8z Ho, 1994; Wu 8c Gonzalez, 1995; Tversky á Wakker,
1995). Hence r will be substantially greater than r' for unlikely events, which explains why PI is
highly unattractive. A numerical example is given in Subsection 3.4 below.
The above discussion may be summarized as follows:
(a) In a first-order approximation, PI is acceptable if and only if the actuarial gain exceeds the
deviation from expected utility.
(b) The value function is much less important than the weighting function for explaining the
aversion to PI.
3.2. Partia!Insurance
It is important to distinguish between the concept of probabilisic insurance addressed in this paper
and the concept of partial insurance. In partial insurance, the consumer pays a fraction (1-r)y,
Ocr~ 1, of the regular premium y, and in retum is reimbursed only for a fraction (1-r)Z of the
damage if the hazard occurs. Thus, partial insurance is essentially equivalent to insurance with a
deductable or co-insurance feature. Note that in both partial and probabilistic insurance the consumer
pays a reduced premium and receives less than full coverage; but while probabilistic insurance yields
either full coverage or no coverage at all, thereby exposing the consumer to additional risk if the
hazard occurs, partial insurance always pays a fixed portion of the damage. As noted by some
authors (see, e.g., Mossin, 1968; Borch,1974), consumers' degree of dislike for deductables is at
variance with the predictions of expected utility theory and risk aversion. Although consumersl3
appear to undervalue both partial and probabilistic insurance, relative to the prediction of the standard
theory, the departures from the theory appear more pronounced in the latter than in the former. As an
illustration of this claim, we conducted a survey of 57 MBA students at the University of Chicago.
Each student was asked to express a willingness to pay for three different fire insurance policies on a
5125,000 house with no mortgage. They were told that the risk of a fire was 1 in 200. The three
policies they considered were full insurance, .99 probabilistic insurance, and .99 partial insurance
(99 percent of any claim will be paid). For each subject we computed the ratio of the willingness to
pay for the probabilistic and partial insurance to the full insurance. For probabilistic insurance the
median ratio was .50, but for partial insurance i[ was much higher, .95 (the difference is highly
significant). For a discussion of partial insurance from the standpoint ofrank-dependent utility
theory, essentially using its nondifferentiability, see Segal 8c Spivak (1990).
3.3. Testiu,K Assu~rtptio~a
The preceding analysis is based on prospect theory. I[ uses two assumptions (see the discussion
follet~~ing Theerem 2.11:
(a) [hat v' is not extremely greater around -Z than around 0;
(b) that v is approximately linear on the small interval [-y,0].
Because (b) is noncontroversial, we focus on the testing of assumption (a).
Assume again that NI and SI are indifferent. Suppose that the values p~` (probability of H) and Z
are explicitly given to the subject. Then the reserva[ion price y fot SI is given by the equa[ion
pv(-Z) - v(-Y).
Next ask [he subject how much more than y she would be willing to pay if the damage Z were larger
by an amount a~0. The reservation price ytb (6~0) is elicited such that
pv(-Z-a) - v(-y-b).
This procedure can be used for testing relative risk aversion. [Jnder expected utility with constant
relative risk aversion (for negative amounts), alZ-bly. It turns out [hat this procedure can also be
used to test that the quotient v'(-Z)Iv'(0) is not too extreme. Roughly, ify is relatively small in
comparison to Z and v'(-Z) is much greater than v'(0), then there may be a discrepancy between the
reservation price x and (1-r)y, but it does no[ exceed (á)ry. Precise results are presen[ed in the
Appendix.la
Theorem 3.3. [f v is concave, then in a first-order approximation,
x ? (1-r)y - (á)ry .
C
Thus, v'(-Z) departs from v'(0) so much that x differs substantially from ( l-r)y only if bla is
nonnegligible. This proper[y is tested in surveys 1, 2, and 3(see Table 1). The given value of a, the
increase in the damage Z, was 100qc, 15qo, and l0alo, respectively. The median increments in the
reservation prices were exactly proportional in each case. Under expected utility, the reservation
price x for PI should then not depart from the actuarially adjusted premium by more than (b)ry -
(Z)ry, which is considerably smaller than the observed departure of nearly 30qo. These observations
confirm our assumptions regarding v'(-Z).
Our survey data can also be used to test a prediction of prospect theory, assuming again that v is
not extremely curved on [-y,0]. According to prospect theory, the reluctance to purchase PI is
driven by the weighting function, not by the value function. Consequently, prospect theory implies
that the ratio xry should remain roughly the same if the probabilities are fixed and the payments are
varied as follows. Assume again that the subject is indifferent between NI and SI, and that x ís the
reservation price for PI. Now the subject is asked to consider the case where, for the same
probability p~ of the event H, the damage Z' is considerably different from Z, say Z'-2Z. Then the
new reserva[ion price y' for SI will also be considerably different from y(under expected value
maximization, y' - 2y). The subject is next asked what is her reservation price x' for PI. Prospect
theory predicts that x'ly' is again close to 1-r, hence x'ly' should be approxima[ely equal to xly.
Indeed, [he ratios of the median values in survey 1 are xly - 0.71 and x'ly' - 0.70.
3.4. Tlte Weighring FwTCtion
We now show that the aversion to PI is consistent with the general characteristics of risky weighting
functions, such as subproportionality (i.e., w(qp~)Iw(p~`) decreases with p~`, see Kahneman á
Tversky, 1979). To illustrate, consider the following parametric family, introduced and characterized
by Prelec (1995).
w(P) - e~P(-(3(-lnp)a) (3.2)15
We have chosen this family because it satisfies subproportionality for the small probabilities that are
relevant to our analysis. Prelec suggested the parameter values a-0.65 and p- 1 because they agree
with the data of Tversky 8c Kahneman (1992) and others.
Suppose that the probability r~` of no payment given the event H is O.OL Assuming the reduced
form for evaluating PI, the decision weight of the event R in the second stage (see Figure lc) is
w(O.OIp~`)Iw(p~`) where p" is the probability of H. The reservation price x for probabílistic
insurance is the same as the actuarially adjusted premium if r(instead of r~) were the conditional
probability of R given H. That is, then x is (1-r)y. Substituting (3.2) yields x-0.773y for p~` -
0.005 and x-0.749y for p~ -0.001, which are in general agreement with our survey data.
Two comments regazding this analysis are in order. First, we have assumed a linear value
function so that probabilistic insurance is explained solely by the curvature of the weighting function.
A linear value function for losses, of course, is a limiting case of the concavity assumption
commonly invoked in expected utility theory, and of the convexity assumption suggested by prospect
theory.b Second, the preceding evaluation of PI has been based on the reduced form, yielding
w(O.OIp~`)Iw(p~`) - r-0.25, which appears reasonable. In contrast, the stepwise evaluation of the
two-ctage Pi tree yields w(0.01)-r-0.07, which appears too low. The reduced form seems [o
provide a more adequate account ofPI than the stepwise evaluation, although in other contexts the
latter has been favored by several authors (Loomes 8c Sugden, 1986; Chew 8r Epstein, 1989; Segal,
1990; Luce 8c voa Winterfeldt, 1994).
4. Discussion
The main results of this paper may be summarized as follows. First, we have observed that
people dislike probabilistic insurance: Most respondents demanded more than 20e1o reduction in
premium to offset a 1r7o default risk. Second, we have demonstrated that such preferences are
generally inconsistent with expected utility theory. Under highly plausible assumptions about utility
for money, the reduction in premium should be essentially equal to the default risk. Third, we have
shown that the reluctance to buy probabilistic insurance is predicted by the weighting funetion of
prospect theory.
[n the classical economic analysis, insurance is explained by concavity of utílity. In prospect
theory, insurance is explaincd by subadditivity of decision weights. Probabilistic insurance offers a
critical comparison of the two accounts. The observed aversion to probabilistic insurance suggests
that the purchase of insurance is driven primarily by the overweighting of small probabilities rather
óGiven the minor impact of marginal utility, a utitity funetion that is convex but not to an extreme degree would give
similar resulu.16
than by diminishing marginal utility in prospect theory (see also Viscusi, 1995). An adequate
analysis of insurance, therefore, should attend to nonlineariry of chance, not merely to the
nonlinearity of value.
To íllustrate the point, consider a situation in which the cost of reducing the default risk (r) to zero
or neaz zero (e.g., going from AA to AAA credit rating, or providing complete coverage for war
damages) is very high. In this case, firms can afford to offer probabilistic insurance at rates that are
significantly lower than the actuarially adjusted standard insurance. A utility-based analysis predicts
that such offers will attract many clients, whereas an analysis based on decision weights predicts that
they will not.
In the terms of prospect theory, the reluctance to purchase probabilistic insurance is another
manifestation of the certainty effect, which underlies Allais' famous example. Although the two
problems appear quite different (Allais' example involves substantial gains, whereas probabilistic
insurance involves substantial losses), in both cases a 10lo move away from certainty produces a
dramatic reduction in the atuactiveness of a prospect.
The reluctance to purchase insurance policy with an explicit default risk is particulazly striking in
light of the fact that essentially all insurance policies are probabilistic, even though they are rarely
described in such tetms. The marketing of insurance, which typically dces not mention the default
risk, is designed to create what amounts to pseudo-certainty (Kahneman 8c Tversky, 1979). Once
the default risk is made explicit, however, it greatly reduces the attractiveness of the policy.
In everyday life, people usually discuss risk in verbal qualita[ive terms that are not readily
translatable into the probability language. For example, a bond with a AAA rating is considered to be
essentially risk-free, and a formula approved for infants is meant to be riskless, although certainty
cannot be achieved in eithercase. In these contexts, a drop below these standazds may be perceived
as a dramatic change in risk. If buyers of securities treat a AAA rating as risk free, and anything else
as risky, then, as noted by Merton (1993), issuers must go to great lengths to achieve the illusion of
zero risk.
Although probabilistic insurance seems somewhat unusual, it is a prototype of most forms of
protective action in which one invests some resources to reduce the probability of some hazard,
without eliminating it altogether. Examples are medical check-ups, the installation of burglar alarm,
and the purchase of new tires. In all these cases, the consumer's action reduces but dces not
eliminate the probability of the hazard in question. The finding that people value the elimination of
risk disproportionally more than the reduction of risk represents a major departure of human behavior
from the canons of rational choice.
Appendix. Proofs17
Throughout the appendix we assume that the value of SI is v(-y), the value of NI is pv(-Z), the
value of P[ is prv(-Z-x) t(1-pr)v(-x), and that these values are the same:
v~-y) - pv(-Z) - prv(-Z-x) t (1-pr)v(-x). (A.I)
We first introduce a notation that simplifies the approximations in which derivatives of v are used.




For a concave utility v, v'(b) ? m(b,a) ? v'(a), and m(b,a) decreases in a and b, i.e. it is smaller as
the intcrval is "more to the right."
Whenever we substitute a derivative v'(a) or v'(b) for m(a,b) below, we ensure that a is close to b,
so that the substitution does not generate a large distortion. As a preparation for the proofs of
Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, we show:
Lemma A.1 (Exact implicit equa[ion for x).
x - (1-r)y t
rx(m(-y,-x)-m(-x,0))-rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z)-m(-x,0))
m(-y,-x)
PttooF. The equalities in (A.l) imply that the third term minus r times the second term minus 1-r
times the first term is zero, i.e.
0 - prv(-Z-x) t (1-pr)v(-x) - rpv(-Z) - (1-r)v(-y) -
-pr(v(-Z)-v(-Z-x)tv(-x)) t v(-x) - (1-r)v(-y) -
-prw(-Z)-v(-Z-x)-(v(0)-v(-x))~ t (1-r)(v(-x)-v(-y)) - r(v(0)-v(-x)).
Note that all value differences in the formula are over intervals of length x or y-x, i.e. intervals of
length of smaller order of magnitude than Z. To see that in a first-order approximation, expected
utility is close to expected value maximization, note that the first part of the formula is preceded by a
factor p which is small; hence this first part can be ignored in a first-order approximation (for y and
[hus p tending to 0 and the v-values fixed). The second part of the formula only concerns outcomes
from the interval [-y,0], and for such moderate amounts expected utility is close to expected value.lK
An exact analysis of these points is provided in the proof ofTheorem 2.2. Continuing the proof of
Lemma A.1, the last formula is equal to:
-rxp(m(-Z-x; Z)-m(-x,0)) t (1-r)(y-x)m(-y; x) - rxm(-x,0) -
-rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z)-m(-x,0)) f (1-r)ym(-y,-x) - (1-r)xm(-y,-x) - rxm(-x,0) -
-rxp(m(-Z-x;Z)-m(-x,0)) t (1-r)ym(-y,-x) - xm(-y,-x) t
rx(m(-y,-x) - m(-x,0))
which implies that
rx(m(-y;x)-m(-x,0)) - rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z)-m(-x,0)) -
t m(-y,-x)(x-(1-r)y). Consequently,
rx(m(-y,-x)-m(-x,0)) - rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z)-m(-x,0))
x - ( l-r)Y -
m(-y,-x)
which is [he equality in the lemma. O
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1. We first derive the last inequality, concerning the lower bound, starting
from the equality in Lemma A.1.
rx(m(-y,-x) - m(-x,0)) - rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z) - m(-x,0))
x - (1-r)y -
m(-y;x)
~ - rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z)-m(-x,Op ~ - rxp(v'(-Z-x)-v'(0))
- m(-y;x)
v~(x) --
~ - rYP(v'(-Z-y)-v'(0)) - r
(~~(-Z-y) - 1)
v'(0) - yp v (0)
from which the lower bound in the theorem follows.
Next we turn to the derivation of the upper bound. By Lemma A.1,
rx(m(-y,-x) - m(-x,0)) - rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z) - m(-x,0))
x - (1-r)Y - - - -
m(-y,-x)
rxpm(-Z-x,-Z) t m(-x,0)(rx-rxp) ~









(-Y) - v'(0) - p(v'(-Z)-v'(0))~ ~
v'(-Y )19
v't ~~l-v'(0) v'(-y)-v'(0) v'(0) rx( ~ 5 ry~ ~- ry(1 - ) from which the upper bound in the
~ ~t Y i v~(-Y) v'(-y)
th~uirin ~~illowti. O
If v is strict)y concave in the neighborhood of 0, but is linear or only weakly concave for more
negative arguments, then the reservation price x can be larger than the actuarially adjusted premium
(see Examples 9, lQ and 1 1 in Table 2). More generally, we have the following result.
Proposition A.2. Assume that v is concave, v'(0) ~ v'(-x), and v'(-Z-x) - v'(-x) so that v is
linear on the interval (-Z-x,-x]. Then x~( l-r)y.
PROOF. Consider the equality in Lemma A.1. We can rewrite it as
rx(v'(-y) - m(-x,0)) - rxp(v'(-y) - m(-x,0))
x - (1-r)y f - - - -
v'(-y)
rx(1-p)(v'(-y) - m(-x,0))
- (1-r)Y t - - .
v'(-y)
By continuous differentiability, v'(0)~v'(-xl implies nt(-x,0) ~ v'(-x) - v'(-y), [herefore the
quo[ient is positive and x~( l-r)y. ~1
PROOF OFTHEOREM 2.2. Note that concaviry of v is not assumed in this proof. We derive a first-
order approximation for y~0, i.e. for y tending to 0 from above. Here r and Z are kept fixed. x
also tends to 0, as -y ~-x ~ 0, and so does p because p- v(-y)Iv(-Z).~ We write o(z) for any
function f(z) such that limZ~,pf(z)Iz - 0. The actuarially fair adjustment of the premium when SI is
changed into PI requires a reduction by ry, therefore ry seems a relevant order of magnitude. Given
that r is a constant, o(ry) formally agrees with o(y), and therefore our formal resul[s are stated in
terms of o(y). Thus, a formal s[atement ofTheorem 2.2 is:
x - (1-r)Y - o(Y).
This is demonstrated next. By Lemma A.l, x-(1-r)y -
rx(m(-y,-x ) - m(-x,0)) - rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z) - m(-x,0))
m(-y.-x)
.
~One can equivalendy derive the first-order approximation from the initial assumption p~ 0 instead ofy.~0. Then y.1.0
follnws from die same equality.20
We prove that the quotient is o(y). In the first term of the numerator, we have limy~,pm(-y; x) -
v'(0) by continuous differentiabiliry, and limy~pm(-x,0) - v'(0) by differentiability. Therefore
limy,~p(m(-y;x)-m(-x,0)) - 0. Because of this, because r is a constant, and because O~x~y,
the first term in the numerator, rx(m(-y;x)-m(-x,0)), is o(y). [n the second term,
limy,lp(m(-Z-x, Z)-m(-x,0)) - v'(-Z) - v'(0), i.e. the limit exists and is real-valued. Because p
tends to 0 as y tends to 0, rp(m(-Z-x; Z)-m(-x,0)) tends to 0, hence its product with x,
rxp(m(-Z-x,-Z)-m(-x,0)), is o(y). Thus the numerator is o(y). The denominator tends to the
positive constant v'(0) by continuous differentiability, and therefore the quotient is o(y). ~
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. This theorem is proved as Theorem 2.1, with the new interpretations for
p and r as explained in the text. []
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2. This theorem is proved as Theorem 2.2, with the new interpretations for
p and r as explained in the text. Note however that, in the formal statement ofTheorem 2.2 displayed
in the proofof the theorem, p is taken variable and its convergence to 0(implied by the assumed
convergence to 0 of y) is considered. This variability of p needs further commenting in the context of
Theorem 3.2. Now p is a decision weight, so we must now permit decision weights to approach 0
arbitrarily closely. In other words, hazardous events H for which the decision weight W(H) are
positive but approach arbitrarily close to 0 must be conceivable. For instance, if W(H) - f(P(H))
where P is a probability and f is a probability transformation function, then continuity of f at 0 is
required.
Also the role of r needs further comments. In the proofof Theorem 2.2, we assumed that, for p
tending to 0, r was kept fixed. This condition is satisfied in the stepwise approach to dynamic
decisions ifevent R is kept fixed, but is more problematic in the reduced approach. To have r fixed
there, we must assume that events H, for which W(H) tends to 0, are associated with events R such
that always W(HR)IVJ(H) - r. This requires variation in the events R which is not a natural
assumption. It is more natural to keep the event R fixed and then permit variability of r-
W(HR)IW(H) for decision weights p tending to 0. That preferable approach we consider next. Wi[h
r varying between 0 and 1, the terms rx(m(-y; x)-m(-x,0)) and rxp(m(-Z-x;Z)-m(-x,0)) in
the nominator displayed in the proofof Theorem 2.2 are still o(y), and [herefore
x - (1-r)Y - o(Y)
still holds. If r converges to a limit r' as p and y tend to 0, then also x-(1-r')y - o(y) holds, as
the added term (r-r')y then is o(y). Note that such convergence is realistic in the case of
subproportionality of [he weighting function w, meaning that r-w(r'p)Iw(p) increases as p
decreases towards 0, for any probability r~. The derived limiting results formalize the claim of21
Theorem 3.2 for the reduced approach, where event R is kept fixed and its "conditional" decision
weight r varies while p and y tend to 0. O
Remark A.3. The expected utility results of this paper can be extended to the case where the loss Z
is not fixed, but is itself a random variable. First assume that -Z designates a probability distribution
over an interval [-Z',-Z"] where we assume that Z"~y; note that we assume that instead of Z, this
same conditional probability distribution is to be substituted at all occutrences, i.e. the probability
distribution of the loss is independent of everything else. The expected utility of -Z is u(-y)~p. For
eacó z, v(-Z-z) is replaced by the expected utility of -Z-z, v'(-Z-z) is replaced by
lim
~pEU(-Z-z) - EU(-Z-z-e)
which exists under moderate smoothness assumptions on v; the e
E
corresponding inequalities are inherited from concavity of v. In proufs, m(-Z-z,-Z) is defined as
EU(-Z) - EU(-Z-z)
With these modifications, Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 still hold true under
z
appropriate smoothness conditions for v.
For Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, new complications arise if Z is variable. Then the decision-weight
distribution of Z can be different in PI than in NI, and it will also vary for limiting p as in Theorem
3.2. Hence there dces not seem to be an easy analog to the expected utility analysis in [his case. O
PROOF OF'1'HEOREM 3.3. We first derive an exact luwer bound for the reservation price x
Lemma A.4 (An exact lower bound for x expressed in terms of a~0 and b). If v is eoncave, then
x ? (I-r)y t
b v'(-y-b) v'(-Z-y)-v'(-Z)
- (á)rY~ v~(p) ~ } ryP - rYP~ v'(~)
-.-~.
PROOF. Subtracting the equality pv(-Z-a) - v(-y-b) from the equality pv(-Z) - v(-y) gives
P(v(-Z) - v(-Z-a)) - (v(-y) - v(-y-b)).
If v is concave [hen it follows that
pav'(-Z) 5 bv'(-y-b) hence
pr v'(-Z) l ~ b
lv'(-y-b) 1 a.For later purpose we rewrite this as:
ryPv; v(-Z) ~ ~ ryá implying
v'(-y-b)
v'(-Z) b v'(-y-b)
rYP~ v'(0) ~~ rya~ v'(0) ~~ i.e.
v'(-Z-y) b v'(-y-b) v'(-Z-y)-v'(-Z)
rYP~ v'(0) ~~ rya~ v'(0) ~ t ryP~ v'(0) ~. hence
v'(-Z-y) b v'(-y-b) v'(-Z-y)-v'(-Z)
rYP~ v,(~) - 1~ 5 ryá~ v,(~) ~ t ryP~ v~(p) ~- rYP-
The lower bound of Theorem 2.1 is
x-(1-r)y ?- ryp(v (-Z-y) - 1), substituting here the inequality derived above gives v'(0)




~ x- 1-r ? a v'(0) v'(0)
O
Next we derive the approximate lower bound of Theorem 3.3. Again, we assume that y.~0 for
fixed Z,r,a, so that also x and p tend to 0.8 The comments to variability of p in the proof of Theorem
3.2 also apply here. In particular, one can also assume that r is variable and substitute its limit r'~0
for r below. As this point requires no substantial changes, we do not discuss it further.
Because p tends to 0, b must also tend to 0. Theorem 3.3 indicates a bound (á)ry for the
deviation from the actuarially adjusted premium, therefore (,- ab)ry seems the relevant order of
magnitude. A formal statement ofthe theorem is
Proposition A.S. x ? (I-r)y - (a)ry t o (arY)-
We next prove this proposition. Consider the second term, -(b)ry~V(-y-b~~, in the lower bound a v'(0)
for x in Lemma A.4. By continuous differentiability of v, v'(-y-b) tends to v'(0), and therefore
v'(-y-b)
tends to 1. It follows that the second term is
b b
v'(0) -(a)ry t o(ary). The third and fourth terms
can be grouped as ryp(1 -
v'(-Z-y) - v'(-Z) )
If y tends to Q then by continuity of v' so does the
v'(0)
numerator and therefore the whole quotient. Therefore, for y sufficiently small, the third and fourth
term together are positive, and can be dropped from a lower bound. This completes the proof.
gAgain, one could equivalendy assume p10 and then derive yf- 0.23
Finally, note that the second and fourth terms in the lower bound in Lemma A.4 can be lazge if
ytb, or y, are not very small and the second derivative of v is extreme around -y or on [-y;Z-y].
In such cases the approximate lower bound in Theorem 3.3 may not be a true lower bound. O
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Tuble 1. Summary of probabilistic insurance surveys
y: reservation price for standard insurance
x: elicited reservation price for a l~lo probabilistic insurance
Survey Context y x xly
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I. University students fire insurance á700 5500 0.71
N- 86 fire insurance ~ 1300 ~900 0.69
2. University students car insurance S l00 ~70 0.70
N - 144
3. Money managers international SI000 5750 0.75
N - 75 imestment26








Figure 1 (Ques[ion: Is PI preferred to any of the upper two'?)y
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